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ABSTRACT 
The modern battlefield continues to rapidly change requiring a quick, reactive, 
and precise strike capability by air forces. The Litening Pod {Tpod), as integrated on the 
A V-8B Harrier, can now be easily used by the pilot as a target coordinate generation 
source for global positioning system (GPS) guided weapons. This thesis has attempted to 
mathematically determine the target coordinate generation accuracy of the Tpod. The 
total mathematical target location error {TLE) was then compared to actual flight test 
data. 
The analytical approach to calculating the accuracy of Tpod generated target 
coordinates has shown to be too conservative. This is due to no consideration being 
given to the possibility that errors are not necessarily additive in nature but instead will 
most likely cancel to some extent and also that performance of the Tpod is better than 
specified. Because of this, the analytical approach shows the Tpod coordinate generation 
capability is not good enough to meet the joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) 
specification at reasonable standoff ranges. 
Actual flight test data shows the Tpod is able to meet the specification threshold 
for JDAM TLE inside 6 nautical miles (nm) slant range. The number one 
recommendation for minimizing the TLE for Tpod generated target coordinates is to fix 
the aircraft software to properly set the relative bit for Tpod targeting. 
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PREFACE 
The technical data contained in this thesis are the result of system analysis and 
flight evaluations of the A V-8B Harrier II aircraft integrated with the AN/ AAQ-28 
Litening Advanced Targeting (AT) Precision Attack Targeting System. Where required, 
pseudo data have been inserted to preserve the classification of "real" A V-8B and Tpod 
capabilities and limitations. All deficiencies identified in this thesis are the opinion of the 
author and may or may not represent the official position of the Naval Air Warfare 
Center Weapons Division, Naval Test Wing Pacific, the United States Marine Corps, or 
the United States Navy. The conclusions and recommendations documented by the 
author should not be construed as attributable to any of the aforementioned authorities or 
for any purpose other than fulfillment of the thesis requirement. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND. 
JDAM are bomb-on-coordinate (BOC) weapons, which require the input of 
accurate target coordinates. Target coordinates can be transferred to JDAM through 
mission planning data transfer devices (pre-planned missions), through on-aircraft 
targeting systems ( self-targeting), via in-flight data transfer devices, or manually through 
cockpit data entry devices. 
The A V-8B can transfer target coordinates using all methods. When using the 
preplanned data transfer method, in-flight data transfer method, or entering coordinates 
through cockpit data entry devices, JDAM will be released using the target coordinates in 
an earth-based reference frame (absolute mode). If an onboard-integrated aircraft sensor 
is used as a source for the coordinates, the JDAM will be released using the coordinates 
in an aircraft-based reference frame (relative mode). 
Most sensors on-board the A V-8B can only produce accurate enough coordinates 
to meet the JDAM specification for TLE well inside reasonable standoff ranges. With 
the introduction of the Omnibus Harrier 2.0 (H2.0) operational flight program (OFP) to 
the AV -8B, the Tpod is now fully integrated as a remote terminal on the aircraft military­
standard (Mil-Std) 1553 Multiplex Databus Interface and treated as an integrated aircraft 
sensor. This integration allows the pilot and aircraft to seamlessly use Tpod generated 
coordinates as a targeting source for JDAM giving the A V-8B a potential self-targeting 
capability. Unfortunately when the Tpod was integrated, the relative targeting mode was 
not programmed correctly and therefore the aircraft cannot take advantage of relative 
1 
JDAM targeting when using the Tpod as the target coordinate source [ 1]. Because of this 
programming error, Tpod generated target coordinates will be used by JDAM as earth 
based (absolute) coordinates assuming the JDAM navigation source is the GPS. Because 
there is no relative JDAM mode using the Tpod as a sensor, all aircraft generated errors 
(position, heading, and bearing error) must be included in the TLE calculations for Tpod 
generated target coordinates. This makes the JDAM TLE specification requirements 
much more difficult to meet. 
1.2 PURPOSE. 
JDAM targeting specifies no greater than 13 meters (m) horizontal error 
expressed in circular error probable ( CEP) and 15 m vertical error expressed in terms of 
linear error probable (LEP). Contained within the 13 m total horizontal error is an 
allowance of 7 .2 m for TLE. Preplanned mensurated coordinates are normally the best 
source for a minimum TLE. Unfortunately, the process for producing mensurated 
coordinates is typically not quick enough to allow for timely prosecution of targets by 
tactical airborne platforms. On modem battlefields a timely reactive capability is a must 
due to the battlefield situation changing rapidly. 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to determine if the Tpod can be used as a 
source for generating precise enough target coordinates for delivery of JDAM reactively 
by an AV-8B even with the software error. An analysis of the total TLE generated by the 
use of the Tpod as integrated on the A V-8B with the H2.0 OFP will be performed for the 
absolu�e and relative modes of JDAM targeting. 
2 
1.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE WEAPON SYSTEM. 
1.3 .1 A V-8B Harrier II. 
The A V-8B Harrier II is a transonic, single cockpit, single engine, jet propelled 
day or night tactical fighter built by Boeing (formerly McDonnell Aircraft). The aircraft 
is powered by a Rolls Royce axial flow, twin spool turbo fan engine. Four exhaust 
nozzles can be positioned and controlled for vertical/short takeoff and landing operations. 
The aircraft features shoulder mounted swept back wings with trailing edge flaps and 
ailerons. The flight controls are hydraulically powered to provide the desired control 
effectiveness throughout the speed range. The cockpit is pressurized and enclosed by a 
sliding canopy. It is capable of performing its mission at night by utilizing low-light 
attack capabilities. The aircraft is 47.75 feet long with a wingspan of 30.33 feet {FT). Its 
maximum gross weight is 32,000 pounds (lb) [3]. 
The A V-8B aircraft is designed for offensive air support and air defense missions. 
It is equipped to carry and deliver an assortment of conventional stores, laser munitions, 
air-to-air weapons, and JDAM from six wing stations and a centerline station. A 25mm 
gun system may be attached to the lower fuselage. The aircraft has night vision goggle 
compatible controls and displays. The A V-8B weapons system is managed in a single 
seat cockpit where the pilot controls aircraft flight, navigation, and attack systems. 
The Omnibus H2.0 OFP was developed and installed in the A V-8B mission 
systems computer (MSC) in August 2003. Developmental testing was completed in 
October 2004 by the A V-8B Joint Systems Support Activity. The H2.0 OFP will 
undergo an Operational Test Evaluation by Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 9 prior to 
being installed in fleet A V-8Bs. The H2.0 OFP was the first OFP to incorporate the Tpod 
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as a remote terminal on the aircraft MIL-STD 1553 Multiplex Databus thus allowing for 
direct communication between the Tpod and the MSC [ 1]. This integration allows for a 
better aircraft to Tpod inertial navigation system {INS) alignment and direct 
communication of data such as target coordinates. A Tpod "designation" can now be 
used directly by the pilot with a simple press of the target designator control {TDC) 
switch located on the throttle. The coordinates and elevation will then be transferred 
directly to the JDAM at weapon release. 
1.3 .2 AN/ AAO-28 Litening AT Precision Attack Targeting System. 
The AN/ AAQ-28 Litening AT Precision Attack Targeting System is a 
multi-purpose targeting and navigation system developed to provide modem tactical 
aircraft with a day and night precision strike capability against land and sea based targets. 
This targeting system is a collaborative effort between Northrop-Grumman Electronic 
Sensors and Systems Division and Rafael of Israel. The Tpod is designed to enhance the 
operational capability of the A V-8B by providing multiple-sensors (Forward Looking 
Infrared, Charged Couple Device (CCD)-Television, Laser marker, Laser Spot Tracker, 
Laser Designator/Rangefinder and a multi-functional tracker) for improved performance 
in various environmental conditions [4]. 
The Tpod is a self-contained sensor and laser designator system for target 
detection, recognition, weapon delivery, and support (Figure 1-1 ). It is 87 inches long 
and 16 inches in diameter. The Tpod contains: 512 x 512 pixel infra-red camera for low 
light level operations, CCD camera for daylight and low thermal contrast conditions, 1.06 
micron laser for the delivery of laser guided weapons, and a night vision goggle 
compatible laser marker for interoperability with ground forces [4]. 
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Figure 1-1 AN/ AAQ-28 Litening AT Precision Attack Targeting System [ 4] 
The Tpod currently mounts on and interfaces with the A V-8B on weapons station 
5. The main purpose of the system is to assist the pilot in acquiring, recognizing, and 
designating ground targets in order to attack them by means of laser guided bombs 
(LGBs ), general-purpose bombs, or cluster bombs. A secondary purpose has now 
become target coordinate generation for JDAM targeting. 
The Tpod employs a 3 7 state Kalman filter to compute target coordinates and 
incorporates additional sensor data from the Tpod inertial measuring unit (IMU). The 
primary benefit is an improvement in the quality of data used to generate target 
coordinates in absolute reference to World Geodetic System 84 (WGS-84) [4]. 
5 
1.3 .3 Joint Direct Attack Munitions. 
JDAM consists of a guidance kit which provides a low cost, standoff, all weather, 
precision strike capability for currently, unguided, freefall general purpose bombs. The 
guidance kit consists of a strake assembly, which attaches around the bomb body and a 
conical fin assembly incorporating the computer, guidance, and steering systems [2]. 
Guidance kits can be installed on MK-83 1,000 lb and MK-82 500 lb bomb 
bodies to respectively configure·a GBU-32 and a GBU-38. A GBU-32 configured 
weapon is presented in Figure 1-2. 
The fin assembly incorporates the system computer, an inertial platform, a 12 
channel OPS receiver, power supply, and actuator assembly that send steering commands 
to the three moveable ( of four) fins [2]. Target data may be programmed into the weapon 
MK83 
WARHEAD 
Figure 1-2 GBU-32 JDAM [4] 
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for preplanned missions or in a reactive role for targets of opportunity using on-board 
sensors. Target coordinates are passed to the weapon through the Mil-Std-1760 
Multiplex Databus interface from the delivery aircraft. The aircraft also provides 
accurate position/velocity state vectors, GPS time, almanac and ephemeris data during 
weapon initialization. The weapon may be released in a tightly coupled mode with the 
weapon INS and GPS providing coupled steering or in an INS-only mode for degraded 
GPS operating environments. 
JDAM requires target coordinates in latitude, longitude, and altitude (mean sea 
level (MSL) or height above ellipsoid (HAE)) referenced to a WGS-84 coordinate frame. 
JDAM accuracy is primarily a function of five key components: aircraft handoff error, 
weapon navigation error, weapon guidance error, TLE, and weapon impact angle [2]. 
Aircraft handoff error is driven by the accuracy of the aircraft navigation system. 
Minimizing aircraft handoff error is especially important when JDAM is released to 
guide to earth-based (absolute) coordinates using JDAM INS-only navigation such as in a 
GPS denied environment. The relative mode of the weapon is used when onboard the 
aircraft sensors are used to generate the target coordinates. In the relative mode, once the 
JDAM acquires a GPS signal after release from the aircraft, the weapon compares its 
GPS position to the JDAM INS position (previously aligned to the aircraft). Any 
difference is assumed to be an aircraft induced position error. The error is then applied as 
a correction factor (bias) to the coordinates (Figure 1-3). This bias is nearly zero when 
the weapon is aligned to a tightly coupled aircraft because both weapon and aircraft are 
using the same navigation source (GPS). However, if the sources are different (loosely­
coupled aircraft and tightly-coupled weapon) the bias allows the aircraft to designate a 
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Figure 1-3 JDAM Relative Targeting Bias 
position relative to its own location without concern for aircraft INS induced errors [5]. 
This bias to the target coordinates will be in the same direction and magnitude as the 
aircraft handoff error. The application of a bias to the weapon did not change the 
position of the target but instead changed the reference frame to the aircraft-based 
(relative) reference frame from the earth-based (absolute) reference frame. 
JDAM navigation error is specified for two navigation modes; the primary 
navigation mode, GPS-aided, and the back up navigation mode, INS-only. GPS-aided 
means JDAM navigation uses position, velocity and time data provided by the GPS to 
update the position and velocity measurements provided by the JDAM INS. INS-only 
means GPS aiding data is not, available and the JDAM INS is the only source of 
navigation inputs. JDAM navigation error is initially a function of aircraft handoff error 
and JDAM INS drift up to the point that JDAM acquires and tracks GPS satellites. When 
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GPS aiding is denied ( or turned oft), JDAM navigation (INS-only) error is a function of 
aircraft handoff error and JDAM INS drift for the entire flight of the weapon. 
Weapon guidance error is a function of how well the JDAM responds to guidance 
commands and flies along the commanded flight path. Weapon guidance accuracy will 
not be addressed by this thesis, as the errors exist for all platforms and sensors regardless 
of aircraft handoff error or TLE. 
TLE is a function of the accuracy of the targeting system. The horizontal TLE 
allotment is currently specified at 7.2 m CEP (for a 60 degree (deg) or greater weapon 
impact angle). The vertical TLE allotment is contained within the total of 1 5  m LEP. 
Figure 1-4 is a graphical summation of JDAM GPS aided horizontal accuracy. 
Figure 1-5 shows how the horizontal errors will build over time due to INS degradation 
during INS-only navigation. 
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Figure 1-4 JDAM GPS - Aided Accuracy [2] 
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Weapon system accuracy is also a function of impact angle, due to elevation 
errors in aircraft handoff, weapon navigation, and TLE. Elevation errors will cause the 
JDAM to guide to a point above or below the target. The impact error associated with the 
elevation error is a function of the impact vector (Figure 1-6). Given an elevation error, a 
shallow impact vector will generally result in a larger miss distance than a steep impact 
angle (Figure 1-7). 
This results in a steeper impact angle yielding less horizontal error sensitivity to 
elevation error. Optimizing the impact angle is crucial in minimizing the elevation error. 
The impact angle error associated with the JDAM specification being used in this thesis 
is for an impact angle steeper than 60 deg. Since the AV-8B is restricted at the current 
time for a weapon impact angle of 65 deg [1], this error will not be addressed in this 
analysis. 
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Figure 1-7 Impact Angle Effect on Miss Distance [2] 
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1.3.4 Attack Profile. 
JDAM can be released throughout most of the A V-8B flight envelope. The attack 
timing will vary greatly with target size, environmental significance, aircrew proficiency, 
weather, and many more factors. Given the range from the target and the time to do so, 
the best-case medium altitude attack would involve initially targeting somewhere 
between 20 and 10 nm from the target. Once a target is obtained and locked, the laser 
designator should be turned on and some sensor line of sight rate developed to allow the 
Tpod to converge on a target position solution as the coordinates are developed through 
the Tpod Kalman filter. This can be affected by arcing around the target until the 
confidence level on the Tpod is labeled as "HI". A "Hf' confidence level is determined 
by the Tpod software and is generally assigned only if using laser ranging as the source 
signifying hi confidence level of the generated coordinates [ 4]. Once this is complete, the 
pilot can designate the coordinates as the aircraft system designation by depressing the 
TDC. This new systems designation can then be selected as the steering point and the 
aircraft turned to the target. Once inside launch acceptable region (LAR), the pilot can 
release the weapon and egress from the target area. See Figure 1-8 for illustration. 
1.4 SCOPE OF THESIS. 
1.4.1 Objectives. 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the accuracy of target coordinates 
generated by the Tpod as integrated on the A V-8B with the H2.0 OFP. The target 
coordinate accuracy will be compared to the JDAM TLE specification for a horizontally 
and flight test data will be discussed as well as recommendations as to how to minimize 
the errors for each of the components. Alternative procedures will be presented and 
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Figure 1-8 JDAM Reactive Attack 
discussed for use of Tpod generated target coordinates. 
1.4.2 Statistical Analysis. 
This thesis assumes a tactical size horizontal target with minimal height is being 
targeted. Therefore, the horizontal error will be characterized in terms of circular error 
probable. CEP is an error where 50% of the weapons will impact within a circle a given 
radius about the target [2]. Vertical error will be quantified in terms of LEP. LEP is the 
value in a single dimension, centered at the position that contains 50% of the vertical 
position estimates [2]. For a horizontal target, any error in the vertical will resolve to an 
error in range, depending on the sensitivity of the horizontal CEP to that error. 
To conduct an adequate characterization of the Tpod's ability to generate target 
coordinates in an earth-based and aircraft-based reference frame, an understanding of 
each individual error contributor is needed. An analytical approach for each error 
contributor will be undertaken using previous flight test data and manufacturer 
specifications. Each of these errors will be transformed into a CEP (in the ground plane) 
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and LEP ( orthogonal to the ground plane) about the target. The individual CEPs and 
LEPs will then be combined in terms of total CEP and LEP to obtain total TLE. 
The analytical data will then be compared to flight test data in an effort to validate 
the analytical approach. Nine dedicated TLE flights were conducted during H2.0 OFP 
developmental testing to determine the target coordinate generation capability of the 
Tpod. Tpod coordinates were compared to the target's surveyed location to derive total 
Tpod TLE in terms ofCEP and LEP. 
1 .4.3 Assumptions. 
During the course of this thesis, general and specific assumptions are made. The 
following are the general assumptions for this thesis. Specific assumptions are noted 
during the analysis of each error source. 
1 .  Flight test aircraft equipment and sensors are operationally representative. 
2. The pilots who conducted the flight test were trained in the use of the Tpod. 
3 .  All errors represent one-sigma values. 
4 .  Small angle approximations are made with respect to milliradians. A 
milliradian is an angular measurement equal to 1/1000 of a radian. It equals 1 
meter at 1000 meters of range. 
5 .  All JDAM are released with greater than 30 seconds time of fall ensuring 
adequate time for GPS acquisition, unless otherwise noted. 
6. The aircraft and weapon are not operating in a GPS denied or spoofed 
environment. 
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7. No dive deliveries or loft maneuvers are performed during weapon delivery. 
The targeting process and release of the weapon are conducted at a constant 
altitude. 
8. A transfer alignment is properly performed for the weapon and Tpod prior to 
the targeting process. A transfer alignment is a maneuver where the attached 
systems (Tpod and JDAM for this thesis) INSs align to the aircraft INS. 
Typically this is accomplished by performing a turn of some sort either on the 
ground or once airborne. This maneuver is performed prior to beginning the 
targeting process. 
1 5  
2. AIRCRAFT POSITION ERROR 
2.1 GPS-INS INTEGRATION. 
A V-8B current aircraft position is determined using an INS tightly coupled with a 
GPS. The aircraft INS is a self-contained, fully automatic dead reckoning navigation 
system. The INS detects aircraft motion and provides acceleration, velocity, present 
position, pitch, roll, and true heading to related systems [4]. The AV-8B currently has a 
Litton AN/ASN-139 Cains II Ring Laser Gyro INS installed. The ASN-139 is specified 
to a position accuracy of 1 nm/hour CEP although significantly better accuracies have 
been obtained regularly during flight. 
Testing of the Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) in the A V-8B 
occurred in 1993. The MAGR continuously provides corrections to the INS for precise 
position keeping, ensuring a "tight" INS to continue the mission even if the GPS signal is 
lost. 
The GPS is a space-based radio positioning system, which provides suitably 
equipped users with highly accurate position, velocity, and time data. This service is 
provided globally, continuously, and under all weather condition to users at or near the 
surface of the earth. GPS receivers operate passively, thus allowing an unlimited number 
of simultaneous users. The GPS has features that can deny accurate service to 
unauthorized users, prevent spoofing, and reduce receiver susceptibility to jamming [4]. 
Two levels of navigation are provided by the GPS, the precise positioning service 
(PPS) and the standard positioning service (SPS). The PPS is a highly accurate 
positioning, velocity, and timing service that is made available only to authorized users 
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(i.e. Department of Defense (DoD) users with the correct crypto loaded). The SPS is less 
accurate positioning and timing service, which is available to all GPS users. 
In order for a user to receive PPS capability it must be able to synchronize with 
the precise-code (P-code ). The P-code is a 267 daylong code sequence; with each of the 
GPS satellites assigned a unique one-week segment of this code. The P-code is protected 
against spoofing by encryption called the Y-code. The P(Y)-code can only be accessed 
by authorized users. This thesis assumes the A V-8B MAGR is utilizing PPS with P(Y)­
code. 
The MAGR receives ranging codes and a navigation data messages from 
NA VST AR satellites through the GPS antenna. The ranging codes broadcast by the 
satellites enable the MAGR to measure the transit time of the signals and determine the 
range between the satellite and the aircraft. The navigation data messages enable the 
MAGR to calculate the position of each satellite at the time of transmission. The MAGR 
can track five GPS satellites and calculate the aircraft exact position from the four best 
satellites being tracked. The MAGR provides time, aircraft position, ground track, 
ground speed and altitude data to the MSC. Position and velocity calculations are based 
on WGS-84 geodetic datum [ 4]. 
There are three position-keeping sources in the A V-8B: INS, GPS, and Air Data 
Computer (ADC) in order of priority. The MSC will automatically upgrade to the best 
available position-keeping mode when the better mode becomes available. The MSC 
also downgrades to the next best available position-keeping source in the event the 
current source is deemed erroneous or unavailable. The navigation system coupling 
mode, which controls the interface between the GPS and the INS, is pilot selectable using 
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the INS mode select switch. The two coupling modes, tightly coupled and loosely 
coupled, are independent of the position-keeping mode. 
Tightly coupled refers to a navigation system in which the GPS is aided by ADC 
and INS data and continually returns corrections to the INS platform. The aiding data 
permits the GPS to keep satellite lock and to stabilize the internal Kalman filter. The 
platform correction data provides the INS with data it can use to better estimate its 
internal platform errors. For this thesis, the AV-SB is assumed to be operating in the 
tightly coupled mode unless otherwise noted. 
2.2 ERROR ANALYSIS. 
2.2.1 Derivation. 
This section discusses aircraft handoff position error in terms of horizontal and 
vertical error. Because the target coordinates generated by the Tpod are in direct relation 
to what the aircraft thinks is its present position, any error in present aircraft position 
translates directly to error in target location. Therefore any target that depends on the 
horizontal position of the aircraft will also have a horizontal uncertainty about the target's 
position in direct proportion. See Figure 2-1 for an illustration. 
Any vertical error in aircraft position will also result in a vertical error about the 
target of the same magnitude. See Figure 2-2 for an illustration. 
So the aircraft horizontal position error ( CEP AJc) equals target horizontal error 
position (CEPTGT). Aircraft vertical position error (LEP AJc) equals target vertical position 
error (LEPTGT)- This error is handed to the JDAM at release of the weapon but will be 
negated if the JDAM acquires GPS satellites (assuming the weapon is released in the 
earth-based coordinate mode.) If aircraft-based coordinates are being used (relative 
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mode) then the JDAM should have the relative bit set at release. A bias can then be 
applied to the aircraft-based coordinates once the weapon GPS position is obtained 
resulting in new earth-based coordinates for the weapon to guide to overcoming the 
aircraft position handoff inaccuracy (Figure 1-3). If both the aircraft and the weapon are 
operating in the tightly coupled mode, this error will be minimized since both are using 
the same position-keeping source even if earth-based coordinates are used. 
2.2.2 Test Results. 
GPS and INS position keeping capability was tested on the AV-8B in June 1993. 
A differential GPS was used as a truth source to characterize the position keeping 
capability of the ASN-139 and the MAGR separately as installed on the AV-8B [7]. 
Table 2-1 shows the results of the seven flights. 
Table 2-1 A V-8B Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver and 
Inertial Navigation System Errors From Flight Test 1 ,  2 [7] 
RSS CEP for RSS SEP for RSS CEP for 
Flight Number GPS GPS INS Positioning Positioning Positioning 
(m) (m) (m) 
N855 9.3 1 7. 1  10.5 
N878 5.6 9.9 8.3 
N879 7. 1 7.7 8.0 
N880 6.6 1 1 .2 7.3 
N881 5.9 8.4 7.3 
N863 6. 1 10.3 5.7 
N864 5.6 12.4 7. 1 
STD DEV 1 .3 3 . 1  1 .5 
RMS 6.7 1 1 .4 7.9 
1 .  A V-8B OPS Integration Test Results, 06/01/93. 
2. Differential OPS Truth Source 
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RSS SEP for INS 
Positioning (m) 
17.8 
6 1 .8 
55.6 
96.8 
142.0 
1 3.0 
13 .8 
48.6 
72.8 
Flight test results indicate the GPS is a more accurate aircraft position-keeping 
source than the INS. This is in keeping with the GPS-INS software integration 
completed for the aircraft, which uses the GPS to update the INS position continuously 
when operating in a tightly coupled mode. 
2.2.3 Aircraft Position Error Analysis. 
The equation for spherical error probable (SEP) is [8]: 
SEP NC = 0.87 CEP NC + 0.76 LEP NC 
Using the flight test results from the previous section, SEP and CEP and known. 
LEP can then be calculated using the equation above. Results are contained in Table 2-2. 
The horizontal CEP of the aircraft position error using the GPS MAGR as a position­
keeping source is 6.7 meters and the vertical LEP is 7.6 meters. Adding one standard 
Table 2-2 A V-8B Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver and 
Inertial Navigation System Errors From Flight Test Including LEP 1 , 2 
RSS CEP for RSS SEP for RSS LEP for 
Flight GPS GPS GPS 
Number Positioning Positioning Positioning 
(m) (m) (m) 
N855 9.3 17 . 1  1 1 .9 
N878 5.6 9.9 6.6 
N879 7. 1 7.7 2.0 
N880 6.6 1 1 .2 7.2 
N88 1 5 .9 8.4 4.3 
N863 6. 1 10.3 6.6 
N864 5.6 12.4 9.9 
STD DEV 1 .3 3 . 1  3 .3 
RMS 6.7 I 1 .4 7.6 
I .  AV-8B GPS Integration Test Results, 06/01/93. 
2. Differential GPS Truth Source 
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RSS CEP for RSS SEP for 
INS INS RSS LEP for INS 
Positioning Positioning Positioning (m) 
(m) (m) 
10.5 17 .8 1 1 .4 
8.3 6 1 .8 7 1 .8 
8.0 55.6 64.0 
7.3 96.8 I 19.0 
7.3 142.0 178.5 
5.7 13 .0 10.6 
7. 1 13 .8 10.0 
1 .5 48.6 64. 1 
7.9 72.8 89. 1 
deviation to these values results in 8.0 m CEP and 10.9 m LEP respectively. These 
results will be used throughout the remainder of this thesis for aircraft position error. 
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3. OPERATOR ERROR 
3.1 INTEGRATION. 
3 .1.1 Multipwpose Color Display. 
There are two multipurpose color displays (MPCD) located on either side of the 
main instrument panel. Both are a 5-inch by 5-inch displays surrounded by 20 multi­
function pushbutton switches. Each MPCD mode selection is accomplished either 
automatically, as determined by the MSC, or manually. The display computer converts 
information received from the MSC to symbology for display on one of the MPCDs. 
Each MPCD has the capability to display color moving map information, Tpod 
information, and other tactical data and display pages [4]. 
3 .1.2 Tpod Image Presentation. 
The pilot chooses which MPCD to display the Tpod image. The Tpod image is a 
512 x 512 pixel presentation. The smallest increment available to the pilot for resolution 
of the target is 1 pixel. In the narrow field of view mode, the Tpod image is 1 deg by 1 
deg [ 4]. This transforms to 0.034 milliradian (mrad) by 0.034 mrad for each pixel using 
the below equation: 
1 7.45 (mrad / deg) x 1 deg / 5 12 pixels = 0.034 mrad/pixel 
As the pilot zooms the display, the Tpod employs a digital zoom so the actual 
number of pixels never changes. However, the Tpod employs a variety of functions to 
help improve the quality of the digital zoom picture and help avoid pixilation such as 
image derotation and image enhancement. Image derotation is an electronic derotation of 
the image vice mechanical. This allows the Tpod the ability to recover high spatial 
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frequency information. The increase in the high spatial frequency retained in the 
derotation yields an effective improvement in the quality of the image at a particular 
zoom level. Image enhancement is a technique by which the image is convoluted by 
sharpening and enhancing the image on a pixel-by-pixel basis. In addition, multiple 
video frames are integrated to increase the signal to noise ratio by the square root of the 
frames integrated. Typically, only four frames are integrated due to time requirements. 
This reduces noise by a factor of two, improving the clarity of the original scene in 
display images [ 4]. 
3 .1.3 Operator Pointing Error. 
. . In the narrow field of view, at zoom level of 6, the image presented is a 1/3-deg 
by 1/3-deg field of view (171 by 171 pixels available for image presentation due to 
digital zoom.) This is the most used level for final picture clarity as it offers the most 
zoom with the least degradation in picture quality in the opinion of the author. At this 
level of zoom, most tactical targets will be clear enough to select the proper targeting 
point at tactical slant ranges. This thesis assumes no error by the operator in selecting the 
exact target point. It also assumes no pixel resolution correction to the error because no 
data exists to reduce the error values. Therefore, any additional operator-pointing error 
beyond pixel resolution considerations will not be addressed in this analysis. 
3.2 ERROR ANALYSIS. 
3.2.1 Derivation. 
This section describes the effects of the error generated by the ability to resolve a 
pixel to 0.034 mrad. Using 0.034 mrad as the error magnitude, CEPMAX and LEPMAX can 
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be calculated. See appendix A for derivation of CEPMAX and LEPMAX for Tpod pointing 
errors. 
3.2.2 Results. 
Table 3-1 shows the effects and resolution in CEP for horizontal error and LEP 
for vertical error. 
As can be seen in Table 3-1, the errors are minimal especially inside 9 nm of slant 
range from the target (2.0 m or less in CEP and LEP). To minimize this error the Tpod 
pixel resolution ability must be increased. This could be accomplished by incorporating 
better image resolution techniques when they become available. 
Table 3-1 TLE Due to Pixel Size of Tpod lmage1 
Slant Horizontal CEP LEP Max Slant Horizont CEP LEP 
Range Range Max Due to Range al Range Max Max 
(NM) (NM) Due to Operator (NM) (NM) Due to Due to Operator Error (m) Operator Operator 
Error Error Error 
(m) (m) (m) 
1 5.0 14.7 5 . 1  2.8 9.0 8.6 1 .8 1 .8 
14.5 14.2 4.7 2.7 8.5 8.0 1 .6 1 .7 
14.0 1 3 .7 4.4 2.6 8.0 7.5 1 .4 1 .6 
13 .5 13 .2 4. 1 2.6 7.5 7.0 1 .3 1 .5 
13 .0 12.7 3.8 2.5 7.0 6.4 1 . 1  1 .4 12.5 12.2 3.5 2.4 6.5 5.9 1 .0 1 .3 
12.0 1 1 .7 3.2 2.3 6.0 5.3 0.8 1 .3 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 3.0 2.2 5.5 4.7 0.7 1 .2 
1 1 .0 10.6 2.7 2. 1 5.0 4. 1 0.6 1 . 1  
10.5 10. 1  2.5 2.0 4.5 3 .5 0.5 1 . 1  
1 0.0 9.6 2.3 1 .9 4.0 2.9 0.4 1 .0 
9.5 9. 1 2.0 1 .8 3 .5 2 . 1 0.3 1 . 1  
1 .  Constant 1 7,000 ft AGL 
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4. LITENING POD ERROR 
4.1 TPOD GENERATED ERROR SOURCES. 
4.1.1 Sensor Integration. 
The Tpod, as discussed in chapter 1, is a multi-pwpose targeting and navigation 
system developed to provide modem tactical aircraft with a day and night precision strike 
capability against land and sea based targets. The main purpose of the system is to assist 
the pilot in acquiring, recognizing, and designating ground targets in order to attack them 
by means of LGBs, general-pwpose bombs, or cluster bombs. A secondary pwpose has 
now become target coordinate generation for JDAM deliveries. 
4.2 ERROR ANALYSIS. 
There are eight sources of error that result in TLE for Tpod generated target 
coordinates. The first two, aircraft position error and operator error, were discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3 respectively. Two additional errors are due to the inaccuracies of the 
aircraft INS but directly affect the performance of the Tpod in generating target 
coordinates and therefore will be discussed in this chapter. These two errors are aircraft 
heading error and aircraft bearing error. The fifth error source is generated when the 
Tpod IMU aligns itself with the aircraft INS via the transfer alignment process. This 
alignment results in a slight error between the two units. The sixth possible error source 
is pointing error in the Tpod. The seventh error is range uncertainty (Afl) or the 
difference in actual distance between the Tpod and the target and what the Tpod thinks is 
the distance. The final error occurs when the Tpod target coordinates are sent to the 
weapon. The Tpod sends the elevation in MSL and the weapon has to convert it to HAE. 
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4.2.1 Heading Error. 
Heading error is error resulting from the aircraft INS' s ability to resolve actual 
heading from indicated heading. Even though the actual aircraft INS drift is corrected by 
the GPS with a tightly coupled system, at any instant in time the INS has a certain 
amount of drift inherent. This drift results in heading error. This heading error transfers 
directly to the Tpod and degrades its ability to resolve actual heading of the sensor line of 
sight. 
4.2.1.1 Derivation. 
The aircraft INS has a specification ofless then 1.0 run per hour drift rate. Actual 
flights have shown the INS to be more accurate than 1.0 run per hour drift rate. Table 4-1 
shows actual INS performance error rates (PER) over the last nine months of China Lake 
based aircraft with ASN-139 INSs installed. (See appendix A for definition and equation 
for root mean square (RMS) and Standard Deviation.) This data was obtained by flying 
the aircraft in the loosely-coupled mode. When these flights were complete a GPS 
Table 4-1 ASN-139 Performance Error Rate From Flight Data 
Aircraft Side Number Date Performance Error Rate (nm per hour) 
83 15 Sep 04 0.2 
83 29 Oct 04 0.3 
83 23 Dec 04 0.0 
84 29 Jun 04 0.4 
84 27 Jul 04 0.2 
84 06 Oct 04 0.3 
84 21 Oct 04 0.2 
84 13 Dec 04 0.4 
RMS of all Fli2hts 0.28 
Standard Deviation of all Fli2hts 0.13 
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position update was manually performed and a PER obtained for INS performance 
analysis. 
Since actual flight data exists, this thesis will use the actual flight data of the 
ASN- 139 performance error rate vice the specification limit of 1.0 run per hour. The 
PER RMS value of 0.28 run per hour plus one standard deviation of 0. 13 nm per hour for 
a total of 0.4 1  run per hour error rate from Table 4-1 will be used for this analysis and 
considered fleet representative. 
4.2. 1.2 Results. 
This thesis assumes that the entire performance error rate is experienced in a 
direction orthogonal to the aircraft vector. This assumption results in the maximum 
effect of this error on target coordinate generation (Figure 4-1 ). 
The maximum heading error that the aircraft could experience is found by the 
following equation: 
TAN(a ) = PER /True Airspeed. 
Table 4-2 is a summary of the heading error (a) as a function of airspeed using 
the previous equation. 
PER 
Figure 4-1 Aircraft Heading Error Due to INS Drift 
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Table 4-2 Heading Error as a Function of PER and Airspeed 
True Airspeed (nm/hour) 
a (mrad) 
(Usine a PER of 0.41 nm per Hour) 
550 0.75 
500 0.82 
450 0.91 
400 1.02 
350 1 .17 
300 1.37 
The error of the INS with respect to heading is dependent on airspeed as shown 
in Table 4-2. For purposes of this thesis 400 knots true airspeed {KTAS) will be used 
throughout the remainder of error calculations. This airspeed is a reasonable compromise 
of time available for targeting and maneuverability at medium altitudes for the A V-8B in 
the opinion of the author. Faster airspeeds will reduce the magnitude of the errors. 
Slower airspeeds will result in longer exposure to the threats. Using 400 KTAS, the 
result of the calculation is a one-sigma error of 1.02 mrad. 
Assuming a heading error transforms directly to the Tpod's ability to generate 
coordinates, the resulting CEP with respect to range can be seen in Table 4-3 using the 
CEPMAX derivation in appendix A. Heading error will not translate into the vertical plane 
since the heading is by definition in the horizontal plane. Therefore LEP will not exist 
for this error. 
Improving this error can be realized by developing newer technologies in 
compass hardware and the air data computer. The current technologies were sufficient in 
the past but now need to be addressed for newer sensors and targeting. The proper 
performance tracking and repair of a poorly performing INS will also help minimize this 
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Table 4-3 TLE Due to Heading Error as a Function of Range1 
Slant Horizontal 
Range CEP (m) 
(nm) 
Range (nm) 
15.0 14.7 152.9 
14.5 14.2 142.8 
14.0 13.7 133.1 
13.5 13.2 123.8 
13.0 12.7 114.7 
12.5 12.2 106.1 
12.0 11.7 97.7 
11.5 11.2 89.7 
11.0 10.6 82.1 
10.5 10.1 74.8 
10.0 9.6 67.8 
9.5 9.1 61.2 
1 .  Constant 17,000 ft AGL and 400KTAS 
Slant Range Horizontal 
CEP (m) (nm) Range (nm) 
9.0 8.6 54.9 
8.5 8.0 49.0 
8.0 7.5 43.4 
7.5 7.0 38.1 
7.0 6.4 33.2 
6.5 5.9 28.6 
6.0 5.3 24.4 
5.5 4.7 20.5 
5.0 4.1 16.9 
4.5 3.5 13.7 
4.0 2.9 10.8 
3.5 2.1 8.3 
error. In addition, increasing the airspeed during the targeting process can minimize the 
error but this has to be weighed against having less time available for the pilot to 
accomplish cockpit tasking. 
4.2.2 Bearing Error. 
Bearing error is the difference between the actual ground track and what the 
aircraft INS thinks is the aircraft ground track. This error can be of the same magnitude 
and direction as the heading error resulting in the worst case of doubling the heading 
error. Therefore it will be treated separate and additive. This error will not be realized in 
the vertical plane for the same reasons as stated in the heading error section. The same 
values for errors, as presented in Table 4-2, will be used again for this error. The same 
procedures for minimizing this error as stated in the heading error section are applicable 
as well. 
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4.2.3 Alignment Error. 
Alignment error is the error generated by the inability of the Tpod IMU to 
absolutely align itself with the aircraft INS. The Tpod IMU is designed to align itself to 
the aircraft INS during the transfer alignment process once an acceptable aircraft INS 
alignment quality is obtained. Any difference between the two after the alignment 
process is the alignment error. 
4.2.3 . 1  Derivation. 
Alignment error is currently specified by the manufacturer to be no more than 
0.35 mrad ( one sigma deviation) [9] of error between the Tpod IMU and the aircraft INS. 
The derivation of CEPMAX and LEPMAX from appendix A, once again, will be used to 
calculate TLE for this particular error. 
4.2 .3.2 Results. 
Table 4-4 is a summation of the alignment error CEPMAX and LEPMAX as a 
function of slant range. No flight test or analytical data exists to justify using any less 
error for this calculation. The manufacturer tightening the tolerance for the specification 
can decrease this error. 
4.2.4 Pointing Error. 
Pointing error is the error generated when the Tpod is pointed at the target. It is 
due to the slight misalignment of the laser and the sensor bore sight. The pilot may think 
the Tpod is exactly on the spot for which the weapon is to impact but it may actually be 
somewhere about the spot in a given radius (Figure 4-2). 
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Table 4-4 Tpod Alignment Error as a Function ofRange 1 
Slant Horizontal CEP LEP Slant Horizontal 
Range Range 
(m) (m) 
Range Range 
(nm) (nm) (nm) (nm) 
15.0 14.7 52.3 29.1 9.0 8.6 
14.5 14.2 48.8 28.1 8.5 8.0 
14.0 13.7 45.5 27.2 8.0 7.5 
13.5 13.2 42.3 26.3 7.5 7.0 
13.0 12.7 39.3 25.3 7.0 6.4 
12.5 12.2 36.3 24.4 6.5 5.9 
12.0 11.7 33.4 23.5 6.0 5.3 
11.5 11.2 30.7 22.6 5.5 4.7 
11.0 10.6 28.1 21.7 5.0 4.1 
10.5 10.1 25.6 20.7 4.5 3.5 
10.0 9.6 23.2 19.8 4.0 2.9 
9.5 9.1 21.0 18.9 3.5 2.1 
1 .  Constant 1 7,000 ft AGL 
Tpod 
... ... ... ' ... ... ' ... ... 
' , ... TJ")tl. Qesignator ' ... ... ' - ... ' ... ... ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 
Figure 4 -2 Tpod Pointing Error 
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Target 
CEP LEP 
(m) (m) 
18.8 18.0 
16.8 17.1 
14.9 16.3 
13.1 15.4 
11 .4 14.6 
9.8 13.7 
8.4 12 .9 
7.0 12.2 
5 .8 11.5 
4.7 10.9 
3.7 10.7 
2 .8 11.1 
4.2.4. 1 Derivation. 
The manufacturer defines the pointing error associated with the Tpod as 0. 1 mrad 
(one sigma deviation) [9]. The derivation ofCEPMAX and LEPMAX from appendix A are 
used once again to calculate CEP and LEP. 
4.2.4.2 Results. 
Table 4-5 is a summation of the alignment error as a function of slant range. 
Tpod pointing error has been speculated to be better than the manufacturer's specification 
during actual flight test but no data exists analytically or through flight test to justify 
adjusting the error for this analysis. The manufacturer tightening the tolerance of the 
specification can decrease pointing error. 
Table 4-5 Tpod Pointing Error as a Function of Range1 
Slant Horizontal CEP LEP Slant Horizontal CEP LEP 
Range Range 
(m) (m) 
Range Range 
(m) (m) (nm) (nm) (nm) (nm) 
15 .0 14.7 14.9 8.3 9.0 8.6 5.4 5 .2 
14.5 14.2 13 .9 8.0 8.5 8.0 4.8 4.9 
14.0 13 .7 13 .0 7.8 8.0 7.5 4.2 4.7 
13 .5 1 3 .2 12. 1 7.5 7.5 7.0 3.7 4.4 
13 .0 12.7 1 1 .2 7.3 7.0 6.4 3 .2 4.2 
12.5 12.2 10.4 7.0 6.5 5.9 2.8 3 .9 12 .0 1 1 .7 9.5 6.7 6.0 5.3 2.4 3.7 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 8.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 2.0 3.5 
1 1 .0 10.6 8.0 6.2 5 .0 4. 1 1 .7 3.3 
1 0.5 I O. I  7.3 5.9 4.5 3 .5 1 .3 3 . 1  
10.0 9.6 6.6 5.7 4.0 2.9 1 . 1  3 .0 
9.5 9. 1 6.0 5.4 3.5 2. 1 0.8 3 .2 
1 .  Constant 17,000 ft AGL 
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4.2.5 Range Error. 
Range error (aR) is the ability of the Tpod to resolve exact range as shown in 
Figure 4 -3. 
4.2.5. 1 Derivation. 
The manufacturer specifies the ability of the Tpod to resolve exact range using the 
laser designator as ± 5 m up to 10 kilometer (km) (one sigma deviation) [9]. Beyond 10 
km the error is specified as ± 0.05% of the range. The derivations of CEPMAX and 
LEPMAX for this error are shown in appendix A and are used to calculate CEP and LEP. 
4.2.5.2 Results. 
Table 4-6 summarizes the range error as a function of range. This error has been 
speculated to be significantly less than the manufacturers' specification but no 
quantifiable flight test data exists to justify using less than the amounts specified by the 
Altitude 
Cl 
L - - - - - - - - - - - ��
p
:-:: r - - -
Horizontal Range 
Figure 4 -3 Tpod Ranging Error 
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Table 4-6 Tpod Ranging Error as a Function ofRange 1 
Slant Horizontal CEP LEP Slant Horizontal CEP Range Range 
(m) (m) 
Range Range 
(m) (nm) (nm) (nm) (nm) 
15.0 14.7 13.7 2.6 9.0 8.6 7.9 
14.5 14.2 13.2 2.6 8.5 8.0 7.4 
14.0 13.7 12.7 2.6 8.0 7.5 6.9 
13.5 13.2 12.2 2.6 7.5 7.0 6.4 
13.0 12.7 11.8 2.6 7.0 6.4 5.9 
12.5 12.2 11.3 2.6 6.5 5.9 5.4 
12.0 11.7 10.8 2.6 6.0 5.3 4.9 
11.5 11.2 10.3 2.6 5.5 4.7 4.4 
11.0 10.6 9.9 2.6 5.0 4.1 4.1 
10.5 10.1 9.4 2.6 4.5 3.5 3.9 
10.0 9.6 8.9 2.6 4.0 2.9 3.6 
9.5 9.1 8.4 2.6 3.5 2.1 3.0 
1 .  Constant 17,000 ft AGL 
manufacturer. To minimize the effects of range error the manufacturer will need to 
tighten the tolerance of the range receivers to remove component errors. 
4.2.6 MSL Altitude to HAE. 
LEP 
(m) 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.6 
2.8 
3.1 
3.5 
4.0 
JDAM requires target coordinates in latitude, longitude, and altitude (MSL or 
HAE) referenced to a WGS-84 coordinate frame which the A V-8B provides. JDAM 
navigation and guidance algorithms use HAE, however. Because the A V-8B can only 
provide target altitude to the weapon as MSL, JDAM will convert the MSL altitude to 
HAE using a table with EGM 84 conversion values every 10 deg in latitude and 
longitude. Values in between the table values are linearly interpolated. Average 
conversion error is 2 to 6 m [2]. For the purposes ofTpod TLE calculations the 
maximum of 6 m error will be used in all LEP calculations (unless otherwise noted) for 
this thesis since coordinate generation is not always directly on the 10 deg EGM-84 lines. 
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5. ANALYTICAL TARGET LOCATION ERROR ANALYSIS 
5.1 TOTAL ERROR FROM ALL SOURCES. 
5 .1.1 Derivation. 
There are eight sources of error for Tpod generated coordinates. The first two, 
aircraft position error and operator error, were discussed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively. 
Tpod specific errors are aircraft heading and bearing errors, Tpod IMU alignment error, 
pointing error, and ranging error. An additional error in the coordinate handoff is the 
conversion of elevation from MSL to HAE in the weapon itself since it is given elevation 
of the target in terms of MSL. These last six errors were all discussed in chapter 4. 
All eight sources for error can be combined using the root-sum-square (RSS) 
method to determine the total target location error in terms of CEP and LEP by the 
following equations: 
TLEcEP = [ (CEP J>OS)2 +(CEP op)2+(CEPhdg)2+(CEPbrg)2+(CEPimu)2+(CEP point)2+(CEP Ml)2] 1/2 
TLELEP = [ (LEP pos)2 + (LEP op)2 + (LEPimu)2+ (LEP poin.)2+ (LEP Ml)2+ (LEPHAE)2] 112 
CEP due to the MSL to HAE conversion is not included in the calculation of total 
TLEcEP since its effects are apparent in the vertical plane only. CEP due to bearing and 
heading error are not included in the calculation of total TLELEP since the effects of these 
two errors are in the horizontal plane only. 
5.1.2 Results. 
Data for total CEP and LEP are listed in Table 5-1 as a function of slant range. 
The TLEcEP and TLELEP are plotted as a function of slant range in Figure 5-1. 
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Table 5- 1 Total Tpod Analytical TLE as a Function ofRange1 
Slant Horizontal 
TLEcEP TLELEP 
Slant Horizontal 
TLEcEP Range Range Range Range 
(nm) (nm) (m) (m) (nm) (nm) (m) 
1 5 .0 14.7 223.6 32.9 9.0 8.6 80.9 
14.5 14.2 208.9 32.0 8.5 8.0 72.3 
14.0 13 .7 194.8 3 1 . 1  8.0 7.5 64. 1  
1 3 .5 13 .2 1 8 1 . 1  30.2 7.5 7.0 56.5 
1 3.0 12.7 1 68.0 29.4 7.0 6.4 49.4 
12.5 12.2 1 55 .3 28.5 6.5 5.9 42.8 
12.0 1 1 .7 143 .2 27.6 6.0 5.3 36.8 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 1 3 1 .6 26.8 5.5 4.7 3 1 .2 
1 1 .0 10.6 120.4 26.0 5.0 4. 1 26.3 
10.5 10. 1  109.8 25 . 1  4.5 3.5 2 1 .9 
10.0 9.6 99.7 24.3 4.0 2.9 1 8. 1  
9.5 9. 1 90.0 23.5 3 .5 2. 1 14.8 
I .  Constant 17,000 ft AGL and 400 KT AS 
240.0 
220.0 
200.0 
1 80.0 
160.0 
i' 140.0 
� 120.0 
100.0 I-
80.0 
60.0 
40.0 
20.0 
0.0 
3.0 
TOTAL TLE at 1 7,000ft AGL 400KTAS 
-+- Total CEP 
--- Total LEP 
5.0 7.0 9.0 1 1 .0 
Slant Range (NM) 
Figure 5- 1 Total Tpod Analytical TLE 
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1 3.0 1 5.0 
TLELEP 
(m) 
22.7 
22.0 
2 1 .2 
20.5 
1 9.8 
1 9.2 
1 8.5 
1 8 .0 
1 7.5 
1 7.2 
1 7. 1  
1 7.5 
5 .2 ANALYSIS. 
Developing a line of sight rate for Tpod coordinate generation will help the Tpod 
converge on target coordinates faster. An arcing maneuver as shown in Figure 1-9 can be 
used to help develop the line of sight rate. However based on Figure 5-1, the coordinate 
generation capability of the Tpod shows this maneuver could be performed as close to the 
target as possible and still not achieve the JDAM TLE specification. Therefore by taking 
only analytical data of total TLE into consideration, the Tpod is not able to develop 
adequate accuracy of target coordinate generation to satisfy the JDAM TLE specification 
for CEP and LEP. 
Since the Tpod cannot set the relative targeting bit properly, all error sources must 
be considered. This thesis has assumed all errors are additive and each component of 
error performs as bad as the Tpod manufacturer's specification. Instead, it is more 
realistic to think some of the errors calculated will actually cancel ( either partially or 
completely.) There is no way to analyze which errors will cancel given the known data 
so no adjustments have been made to these calculations. However, one could speculate 
that the heading and bearing errors would most likely cancel to some extent. The range 
error would most likely cancel other errors to some extent especially as the line of sight 
of the Tpod gets more vertical. 
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Using the Tpod as a source of generating earth-based (absolute) coordinates for 
JDAM targeting is not recommended based purely on the worst-case analytical data. If 
analytical data is to be used then it will need to be adjusted to account for some of the 
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error mitigation in the calculation. This error adjustment is beyond this thesis and would 
require flight test to quantify. 
5.4 ALTERNATIVES. 
An alternative to using the total error analytical approach is to adjust TLE for the 
relative targeting mode. Using a relative mode some of the error can be eliminated. 
There are two methods of targeting JDAM in a relative mode. The first is to set the 
relative mode of the JDAM via aircraft software. This is accomplished by the aircraft 
setting the correct bit at release of the weapon. The A V-8B is capable of setting this bit 
using all other on-board sensors except the Tpod due to a software error as discussed 
previously. The second method of targeting in the relative mode is to tum the GPS 
tracking capability of the JDAM "off" prior to release by performing the "GPS halt" 
procedures. This is not a straightforward procedure but can be performed in the cockpit 
during flight by the pilot with training. The same results will be achieved if the GPS 
signal is not obtained during the flight of the weapon for any reason such as when 
operating in a GPS denied environment or when the time of fall is shorter than the GPS 
acquisition time. By not using GPS guidance during weapon flight, an additional error 
must be added to the TLE. This additional error occurs during the course of flight of the 
weapon due to the drift rate of the JDAM INS operating without GPS corrections (see 
Figure 1-6). 
If either of these relative modes is used, the aircraft position error, heading error, 
and bearing error can be removed from the analysis. This is because the solution for the 
coordinates is relative to the aircraft and will guide to those relative coordinates vice 
earth-based coordinates. By deleting these errors from the total TLE, the relative mode 
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TLEcEP and TLELEP are significantly decreased as shown in Table 5-2. Figure 5-2 is a 
graphical presentation of the data in Table 5-2. 
An arcing maneuver as shown in Figure 1-9, once again, will help develop the 
needed line of sight rate for quick Tpod coordinate generation. However, the coordinate 
generation capability of the Tpod in the relative mode using analytical data still shows 
this maneuver should be performed well within 5 run of the target. This is closer than 
desired to the target allowing for very little standoff capability. Keep in mind, the errors 
determined analytically even from the relative targeting mode are still the worst-case 
possible for each of the errors being used in the calculation. The magnitude of the 
difference in total analytical TLE and relative mode analytical TLE is what is important. 
Table 5-2 Total Tpod Analytical TLE Less Aircraft Error as a Function ofRange 1 
TLEcEP TLELEP 
TLEL 
Slant Horizontal Less Less Slant Horizontal TLEcEP EP 
Range Range A/C A/C Range Range Less A/C 
Less 
Error A/C 
(nm) (nm) Error Error (nm) (nm) (m) Error 
(m) (m) 
(m) 
15.0 14.7 56.3 31.1 9.0 8.6 21.2 19.9 
14.5 14.2 52.7 30.1 8.5 8.0 19.0 19.1 
14.0 13.7 49.2 29.2 8.0 7.5 17.0 18.2 
13.5 13.2 45.9 28.2 7.5 7.0 15.1 17.4 
13.0 12.7 42.7 27.3 7.0 6.4 13.3 16.5 
12.5 12.2 39.5 26.3 6.5 5.9 11.6 15.8 
12.0 11.7 36.6 25.4 6.0 5.3 10.0 15.0 
11.5 11.2 33.7 24.5 5.5 4.7 8.5 14.3 
11.0 10.6 31.0 23.6 5.0 4.1 7.3 13.7 
10.5 10.1 28.3 · 22.6 4.5 3.5 6.3 13.3 
10.0 9.6 25.8 21.7 4.0 2.9 5.3 13.1 
9.5 9.1 23.4 20.8 3.5 2.1 4.2 13.6 
1 .  Constant 17,000 ft AGL 
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Figure 5-2 Total Tpod Analytical TLE Less Aircraft Error 
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Analytically, the error decreases by a magnitude of 2 to 3 when aircraft position error, 
heading error, and bearing error are factored out. The relative targeting mode shows 
promise if one considers some of the errors will cancel and the individual performance of 
each component is typically better then the specification for the Tpod. 
If the JDAM is launched in an INS-only mode either due to not acquiring the GPS 
satellites or because the pilot performed GPS halt procedures then the errors will be 
slightly worse then shown in Figure 5-2. This is because the weapon has to rely only on 
its internal INS for navigation. This induces an additional error, which is added to the 
TLE in Figure 5-2 based on the amount of time the weapon is in flight. After 30 seconds 
an additional error of 3 m should be added. After 60 seconds an additional error of 8 m 
4 1  
should be added [2]. This additional guidance error has not been added to any tables or 
figures presented. 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS. 
The analytical approach to calculating the accuracy of Tpod generated coordinates 
has shown to be overly conservative. If no consideration is given to the fact that not all 
errors are additive and that some errors actually cancel ( completely or partially) then the 
analytical numbers show the Tpod does not meet the specification for target coordinate 
generation at reasonable standoff ranges. If an adjustment were made to the calculation 
because some of the errors cancel and the actual performance of the individual Tpod 
errors is better than the manufacturer's specification, the analytical approach shows there 
is promise to using the Tpod for target coordinate generation. 
The analytical approach has also shown that if the source of the coordinates is an 
aircraft sensor, the best method of releasing the weapon is in the relative mode. 
Unfortunately, due to a software coding error, the A V-8B is not capable of setting the 
relative bit properly to achieve the relative targeting mode using the Tpod as the target 
coordinate source. Because of this, the weapon will guide to earth-based coordinates 
unless the OPS navigation mode of the weapon is interrupted somehow such as by 
performing OPS halt procedures. Unfortunately, this also induces additional error due to 
degradation of the JDAM INS error over time. 
42 
6. FLIGHT TEST RESULTS 
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF FLIGHT TEST. 
Over the course of the developmental flight-testing of the H2.0 OFP from the 
summer of 2003 to the summer of 2004, nine test sorties were dedicated to collecting 
actual Tpod generated TLE data. The target was a surveyed point via classified sources. 
All nine test flights were conducted on a dedicated telemetry capable range. All flight 
profiles were performed at approximately 17,000 ft above ground level (AGL) from 20 to 
3 nm in slant range. Airspeeds varied, but were generally conducted at maximum 
endurance. These flights were dedicated to capturing the total TLE capability of the 
Tpod. No attempt was made to determine aircraft position errors during this testing since 
the relative targeting bit could not be set. 
The pilot set the center of the Tpod on the surveyed spot of the target. Once the 
Tpod was centered, the laser designator was turned on and the pilot flew directly toward 
the target. An arcing maneuver to produce sensor line of sight rate was not performed as 
discussed in previous chapters because quick coordinate convergence was not considered 
at the time. The only line of sight rate achieved was due to target over flight. Once the 
target was over flown, the pilot secured the laser and the pass was complete. 
The latitude, longitude, and elevation in MSL, collected through on board the 
aircraft and telemetry sources, was sent to the Precision Targeting Branch at Naval Air 
Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD), China Lake, California for analysis. 
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6.2 RESULTS OF FLIGHT TEST. 
The Precision Targeting Branch compared the coordinates generated by the Tpod 
to the classified surveyed coordinates of the target. The data was plotted as total TLE 
verses slant range. The data includes all possible errors, the same discussed throughout 
this thesis with the exception of the MSL to HAE conversion, in earth-based (absolute) 
coordinates. The MSL to HAE conversion was not part of the TLE collection effort 
because this conversion talces place in the weapon itself. There were no weapons on 
board the aircraft for these flights. The TLE of the actual Tpod generated coordinates 
using the laser designator is plotted in Figure 6-1. Using the 50% confidence error data 
provided by the Targeting Branch results in the horizontal CEP and vertical LEP shown. 
Actual flight test generated Tpod target coordinates met the JDAM specification 
for horizontal CEP at less then 6.0 nm slant range. The vertical TLE met the 
specification throughout the range presented. 
Based on the analytical data in chapter 5, a speculation can be made of what 
would happen if aircraft errors (position, bearing, and heading) were factored out of the 
flight test data to show a relative mode capability. Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the 
magnitude of difference in total error analytical data and relative error analytical data. If 
this same magnitude of error is factored out of the flight test data then the data shown in 
Figure 6-1 should have no problem meeting the TLE requirements throughout the range 
of the graph. This would significantly increase the stand off range at which target 
coordinates could be generated. 
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Figure 6-1 Flight Test Tpod TLE [10] 
6.3 COMPARISION TO ANALYTICAL DATA. 
Flight test data was then plotted against analytical data for comparison as shown 
in Figure 6-2 (horizontal CEP) and Figure 6-3 (vertical LEP). As can be seen from these 
two figures there is a significant difference in analytical data and flight test data. This 
difference shows that most likely some error cancellation occurred and better than 
advertised Tpod component performance is apparent in the actual flight-test data. 
Since the actual flight test data contains all error sources with the exception of the 
MSL to HAE conversion, the analytical data has been adjusted for all error sources 
without the HAE conversion error included. 
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS OF FLIGHT TEST RESULTS. 
Based upon the results of flight test data, the arcing portion of the profile should 
be conducted inside 6 run if possible. This will help ensure JDAM TLE requirements are 
met for JDAM specification compliance. If and when the aircraft, using the Tpod as a 
source for target coordinates, can set the relative targeting bit properly, then the arcing 
maneuver can be performed at significantly greater ranges as speculated in section 6.2. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
7.1 DECISION TREE. 
A JDAM targeting decision diagram is shown in Figure 7-1. This decision tree is 
a summary of which coordinate type will be used based on the source of the coordinates 
and what capabilities the source brings for targeting JDAM. The important point to 
remember is any mensurated coordinates (minimum TLE) used for targeting should not 
be over-written and should be released in the earth-based reference frame. If the source 
of the coordinates is an "on aircraft" sensor then the relative bit should be set if possible 
and the weapon released in a relative targeting mode. 
Earth-based 
Preplanned or Coordinates .... (Absolute Mensurated Targeting) Coordinates 
j No 
Can GPS Halt 
Reactive On- Can Relative Bit Procedures be ----+ .... board Sensor be Set? ..... Performed and 
Targeting No Can Additional 
Coordinate Error Be 
Generation Accepted? 
Yes 
/Yes 
H 
Aircraft-based 
Coordinates (Relative 
Targeting) 
Figure 7-1 JDAM Targeting Decision Diagram 
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If the relative bit can not be set for a sensor such as the Tpod then an analysis of 
the total error will have to be made such that if TLE is acceptable then perform the 
JDAM GPS halt procedures and release the weapon in the aircraft-based reference frame 
(relative mode). If those errors are unacceptable then release the weapon in the earth­
based coordinate reference frame depending on rules of engagement (ROE). The 
battlefield commander determines the level of accuracy desired for GPS guided weapons 
based upon the battlefield situation by setting the ROE. If at any time the TLE is greater 
then the ROE then the weapon should not be released. 
7.2 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS. 
The analytical approach to calculating the accuracy of Tpod generated coordinates 
by this thesis has shown to be too conservative. This is due to giving no consideration to 
the possibility that the errors are not all additive in nature but instead partially or totally 
cancel in some cases. In addition, the individual Tpod error components cannot be 
adjusted to more accurate values because no data exists to justify the correction. Because 
no consideration is given to the possible cancellation of errors or actual performance of 
Tpod components, the analytical numbers show the Tpod coordinate generation 
capability does not meet the JDAM specification for TLE at reasonable standoff ranges. 
There is no way to know which errors will cancel and to what magnitude without 
conducting further testing. There is also no way to predict actual performance without 
further testing. Even if further testing is conducted, the actual error cancellations may not 
be consistent. However, the analytical approach to calculating errors has shown the 
magnitude of difference between relative targeting and earth-based targeting and gives 
insight into what would happen with flight test data if adjusted for relative targeting. 
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Actual flight test data also shows the Tpod TLE data is only able to meet the 
specification threshold for JDAM TLE as currently implemented in the A V-8B at slant 
ranges less than 6 run. If, however, the aircraft software is corrected and the relative 
targeting bit can be set, the data shows potential of easily meeting the JDAM 
specification threshold for TLE at ranges significantly greater then 6 run. 
Aircraft position error should be adjusted based upon known improvements in 
GPS accuracy that cannot be discussed in this thesis due to the source. By making this 
adjustment the total error of the weapon would either decrease or additional error could 
be allowed in different areas such as TLE to still maintain the specification of a 13 m 
weapon. If the TLE were increased, the Tpod (and other sensors for that matter) might be 
able to more easily meet the specification of target coordinate generation accuracy. 
In reality, the battlefield commander will determine what level of accuracy is 
acceptable for a given mission by setting the ROE. A 13 m CEP specification for JDAM 
was great for driving design requirements, but now that the system has been designed and 
fielded the commander will use the weapon system as needed for a given situation. For a 
particular mission, the commander not need a CEP of 13 m but may be willing to accept 
something greater. In this case, using the Tpod as the target coordination source may be 
sufficient to meet the commander's ROE. 
7 .3 RECOMMENDATIONS. 
The first recommendation is to fix the aircraft software to set the relative bit 
properly for Tpod targeting. The only potential work-around for this particular issue is 
to perform JDAM GPS halt procedures and force the weapon to guide to aircraft-
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based (relative) coordinates. This unfortunately also induces JDAM INS-only drift 
errors making the accuracy of the weapon worse over the time of flight of the weapon. 
The next recommendation is to generate elevation in HAE vice MSL if 
possible. This will reduce, by as much as 6 meters, elevation error caused when the 
weapon converts MSL to HAE. In addition, to reduce elevation error even further, the 
pilot should be allowed to select a steeper impact angle than 65 deg. The impact 
angle needs to be selectable by the pilot based on the accuracy of the sensor generating 
the coordinate. 
The most precise position-keeping mode of the aircraft should always be 
used. Thought should be given to installing a more accurate INS and air data 
computer in the A V-8B when one becomes available to help minimize aircraft position 
handoff and heading errors. When it becomes available, incorporate better processing 
of the Tpod image to help minimize any pixel size induced errors. To help minimize 
heading and bearing errors during earth-based coordinate targeting, increase the 
airspeed of the aircraft during the targeting process. Continue to pressure the 
manufacturer to tighten the tolerance level for the Tpod INS alignment, pointing 
accuracy, and ranging accuracy to help minimize the remaining errors. Flight test 
should also be performed to determine rules of thumb for target coordinate 
generation accuracy for use on the battlefield. 
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APPENDIX A 
This section describes the theory behind the statistical analysis and provides some 
insight into the terms and quantities used in the thesis. 
STATISTICAL THEORY. FORMULA, AND DERIVTIONS. 
1. All error distributions are considered to be normal (i.e. Gaussian). 
2. The root mean square (RMS) and standard deviations (StdDev) for flight test data 
were calculated using the Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for RMS and the Excel 
function for StdDev. 
3. Circular Error Probable and Linear Error Probable are used throughout this thesis in 
order to compare the results to the JDAM specification, which is calculated in those 
terms. 
4. Circular Error Probable is defined as an indicator of the delivery accuracy of a 
weapon system used to determine probable damage to a target. CEP is the radius of a 
circle within which half of the weapons are projected to fall. For the purposes of this 
thesis all horizontal error terms are calculated in terms of CEP. 
5. LEP is the value in a single dimension, centered at the position that contains 50% of 
the vertical position estimates. For a horizontal target, any error in the vertical will 
resolve to an error range, depending on the sensitivity of the horizontal CEP to that 
error. For this thesis, the conversion of vertical error to a horizontal error was not 
made since the A V-8B sets the weapon impact angle to 65 deg by default. This meets 
the JDAM specification for horizontal CEP with a weapon impact angle greater than 
60 deg. 
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DERIVATIONS. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
None. 
Chapter 2 - Aircraft Position Error 
Aircraft horizontal error (CEP) and spherical error (SEP) were given as results in 
reference 8. Vertical error (LEP) was calculated using an equation from the test report. 
Given SEP and CEP from the test report, LEP can be calculated via the following 
equation: 
SEP NC = 0.87 CEP NC + 0.76 LEP NC 
This equation originally came from the Integrated Multi-service Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan for NA VST AR GPS (reference 8). 
Chapter 3 - Operator Error 
Operator error is defined as only the error associated with resolution of the pixel 
size for the purposes of this thesis. No other errors were taken into consideration because 
the point to be targeted is assumed to be the point under the center of the Tpod display. If 
the center of the display is not on the correct spot then the operator is assumed to have 
adjusted the Tpod appropriately. The pixel size presented to the operator is 0.034 mrad. 
This is derived from the following equation: 
17.45 (mrad / deg) x 1 deg / 5 12 pixels = 0.034 mrad / pixel 
The amount of error in meters with respect to range can be calculated in terms of 
CEPMAX and LEPMAX. CEPMAX is defined as the maximum CEP in the horizontal plane 
projected by a one-sigma deviation from actual of a bearing, heading, INU alignment, 
pointing, and ranging error as shown in Figure A-1. 
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Altitude 
a 
Horizontal Range 
CEPMAX 
Figure A-1 CEPMAX Graphical Presentation 
LEPMAX is defined as the maximum LEP in the vertical plane orthogonal to the 
CEPMAX within the footprint of the CEP, projected by a one-sigma deviation from actual 
of a bearing, heading, INU alignment, and pointing error as shown in Figure A-2. 
Figure A-3 shows a line orthogonal to the laser vector emanating from the Tpod 
used in follow on calculations. 
The error orthogonal to the laser vector = sin(angular error)x slant range (m). The 
slant range in meters = slant range (nm) x 6079 ft/nm x 0.3048 m/ft. The CEPMAX in now 
defined in the following equation: 
CEPMAX = error orthogonal (m) / sin ( a - error). 
LEPMAX is defined through the following formulas using Figure A-3 for 
reference: 
X = Altitude / tan ( a + error) 
Y = Altitude / tan (a - error) 
Z = y - x  = Altitude (1 / tan (a - error) - 1 / tan (a + error)) 
LEPMAX is then defined by the equation: 
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Figure A-3 Error Orthogonal to Laser Vector 
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LEPMAX = Z (tan (a - error)) = Altitude (m) (1 - tan (a - error) / tan (a + error)) (tan(a ­
error)) 
Chapter 4 - Litening Pod Error 
Heading and bearing error were calculated using an RMS value of Performance 
Error Rate (PER) of actual aircraft INS data. RMS was calculated using the following 
formula: 
RMS = (((Nl )"2 + (N2)"2 + (N3)"2 + .. . + (Ni)"2) / i)"( l /2) 
A standard deviation was then calculated using Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet 
StdDev equation. The two were added together to achieve a maximum PER resulting in a 
PER of 0.41 nm/hr. To calculate the maximum angular error using this error rate the 
PER is then plotted orthogonal to the aircraft vector ( as in Figure 4-1 )  because �is is 
where the error will cause the most deviation in heading and bearing. To obtain the 
angular error the equation is: 
tan(a) = PER / KTAS or 
a = tan- 1 (PER/KT AS). 
This then gives an error a (mrad) to use in the calculation of CEPMAX and LEPMAX as 
defined in the chapter 3 section of this appendix. 
Alignment error and pointing error were also calculated using CEPMAX and 
LEPMAX as in the previous section to this appendix. 
The error due to Tpod ranging error (�R) is shown in Figure A-4. 
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Figure A-4 Error Due to Tpod Ranging Error 
The magnitude of �R is specified by the manufacturer and can be converted into terms 
for CEPMAX and LEPMAX through the follow equations: 
CEPMAX = (�R) cos ( a) and LEPMAX = (�R) sin ( a). 
Chapter 5 - Total Error 
The following definitions apply: 
CEPpos is the total horizontal aircraft position error from chapter 2. 
CEP op is the total horizontal operator error from chapter 3. 
CEPhdg is the total horizontal heading error from chapter 4. 
CEPbrg is the total horizontal bearing error from chapter 4. 
CEPimu is the total horizontal Tpod alignment error from chapter 4. 
CEP point is the total horizontal Tpod pointing error from chapter 4. 
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CEP �R is the total horizontal Tpod ranging error from chapter 4. 
LEP pos is the total vertical aircraft position error from chapter 2. 
LEP op is the total vertical operator error from chapter 3. 
LEPimu is the total vertical Tpod IMU alignment error from chapter 4. 
LEP point is the total vertical Tpod pointing error from chapter 4. 
LEP �R is the total vertical Tpod ranging error from chapter 4. 
1=,EPttAE is the total vertical MSL to HAE conversion error from chapter 4. 
The total TLE of Tpod generated target coordinates was defined as the RS S of all 
CEP error sources and the RSS of all LEP error sources: 
TLEcEP = [(CEPpos)2 +(CEP 01,)2+(CEPhdg)2+(CEP1,,1)2+(CEPunu)2+(CEPpomt)2+(CEP AR)2] 112 
TLELEP = [(LEPpos)2 + {LEPop)2 + {LEPimu)2+ {LEPpo1nt)2+ {LEPAR.)2+ {LEPHAE)2] 112 
The total TLE Less aircraft error was calculated using the same formula minus the 
aircraft generated errors as in the following equations: 
TLEcEP = [(CEPop)2 + (CEPimu)2 + (CEPpomt)2 + {CEPAR)2] 112 
TLELEP = [ (LEP op)2 + (LEPimu)2+ {LEP point)2+ {LEP AR.)2+ {LEPHAE)2] 112 
These resulting TLEc8p and TLELEP were then plotted with respect to range. 
Chapter 6 - Flight Test 
None. 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions 
None. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table B- 1 Angle and Range at Constant 17,000 ft AGL 
Angle and Range at Constant 17,000 Ft AGL 
Slant Slant Range Slant Horizontal Range Range Angle (Rad) Angle (Deg) 
(NM) 
(ft) Range (M) (NM) 
1 5 .0 9 1 , 1 85 .0 27,793.2 14.7 0. 1 8753 1 10.7 
14.5 88, 145 .5 26,866.7 14.2 0. 194079 1 1 . 1  
14.0 85, 106.0 25,940.3 13 .7 0.201 104 1 1 .5 
1 3.5 82,066.5 25,013 .9 13 .2 0.208660 12.0 
13 .0 79,027.0 24,087.4 12.7 0.2 168 1 1 12.4 
12.5 75,987.5 23, 1 6 1 .0 12.2 0.22563 1 12.9 
12.0 72,948.0 22,234.6 1 1 .7 0.235205 13 .5 
1 1 .5 69,908.5 2 1 ,308 . 1  1 1 .2 0.245638 14. 1  
1 1 .0 66,869.0 20,38 1 .7 10.6 0.257050 14.7 
10.5 63,829.5 19,455.2 10. 1  0.269588 1 5.4 
10.0 60,790.0 1 8,528.8  9.6 0.28343 1 16.2 
9.5 57,750.5 17,602.4 9. 1 0.298796 17. 1 
9.0 54,7 1 1 .0 16,675 .9 8.6 0.3 1 5954 18. 1  
8.5 5 1 ,67 1 .5 1 5,749.5 8.0 0.335246 1 9.2 
8.0 48,632.0 14,823 .0 7.5 0.357 106 20.5 
7.5 45,592.5 13,896.6 7.0 0.382098 21 .9 
7.0 42,553.0 12,970.2 6.4 0.410973 23.5 
6.5 39,5 13 .5 12,043 .7 5.9 0.44475 1 25 .5 
6.0 36,474.0 1 1 , 1 17.3 5.3 0.484861 27.8 
5.5 33,434.5 10, 1 90.8 4.7 0.533392 30.6 
5 .0 30,395.0 9,264.4 4. 1 0.593544 34.0 
4.5 27,355.5 8,338.0 3 .5 0.670589 38.4 
4.0 24,3 16.0 7,41 1 .5 2.9 0.774177 44.4 
3.5 2 1 ,276.5 6,485 . 1  2. 1 0.925636 53.0 
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Table B-2 CEPMAX and LEPMAX at Constant 1 7,000 ft AGL Page 1 
Slant Horizontal CEP Max LEP Max Due CEP Max LEP Max Due Range Range Due to X rad to X rad (m) Due to X to X rad (m) (NM) (NM) (m) rad (m) 
15 .0 14.7 14.9 8.3 5 . 1  2.8 
14.5 14.2 13 .9 8.0 4.7 2.7 
14.0 13 .7 13 .0 7.8 4.4 2.6 
1 3 .5 13 .2 12. 1 7.5 4. 1 2.6 
13 .0 12.7 1 1 .2 7.3 3 .8 2.5 
12.5 12.2 10.4 7.0 3 .5 2.4 
12.0 1 1 .7 9.5 6.7 3.2 2.3 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 8.8 6.5 3 .0 2.2 
1 1 .0 10.6 8.0 6.2 2.7 2. 1 
10.5 10. 1  7.3 5 .9 2.5 2.0 
10.0 9.6 6.6 5.7 2.3 1 .9 
9.5 9. 1 6.0 5.4 2.0 1 .8 
9.0 8.6 5.4 5.2 1 .8 1 .8 
8.5 8.0 4.8 4.9 1 .6 1 .7 
8.0 7.5 4.2 4.7 1 .4 1 .6 
7.5 7.0 3.7 4.4 1 .3 1 .5 
7.0 6.4 3 .2 4.2 1 . 1  1 .4 
6.5 5.9 2.8 3 .9 1 .0 1 .3 
6.0 5 .3 2.4 3 .7 0.8 1 .3 
5.5 4.7 2.0 3.5 0.7 1 .2 
5.0 4. 1 1 .7 3 .3 0.6 1 . 1  
4.5 3.5 1 .3 3 . 1  0.5 1 . 1  
4.0 2.9 1 . 1  3 .0 0.4 1 .0 
3 .5 2. 1 0.8 3 .2 0.3 1 . 1  
Error (rad) = 0.0001 Error ( rad) = 0.000034 
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Table B-3 CEPMAX and LEPMAX at Constant 17,000 ft AGL Page 2 
Slant Horizontal CEP Max 
LEP Max Due 
CEP Max 
LEP Max Due Range Range Due to X rad 
to X rad (m) 
Due to X 
to X rad (m) (NM) (NM) (m) rad (m) 
1 5 .0 14.7 152.9 84.4 52.3 29. 1 
14.5 14.2 142.8 8 1 .7 48.8 28. 1 
14.0 13 .7 133 . 1  79.0 45.5 27.2 
13 .5 13 .2 123 .8 76.3 42.3 26.3 
13 .0 12.7 1 14.7 73.6 39.3 25 .3 
1 2.5 1 2.2 1 06. 1 7 1 .0 36.3 24.4 
12.0 1 1 .7 97.7 68.3 33.4 23 .5 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 89.7 65.6 30.7 22.6 
1 1 .0 10.6 82. 1  63 .0 28. 1 2 1 .7 
1 0.5 10. 1  74.8 60.3 25.6 20.7 
10.0 9.6 67.8 57.7 23 .2 19.8 
9.5 9. 1 6 1 .2 55. 1 2 1 .0 1 8.9 
9.0 8.6 54.9 52.5 1 8.8 1 8.0 
8.5 8.0 49.0 49.9 16.8 1 7. 1  
8.0 7.5 43 .4 47.3 14.9 16.3 
7.5 7.0 38. 1 44.8 1 3 . 1  15 .4 
7.0 6.4 33.2 42.3 1 1 .4 14.6 
6.5 5 .9 28.6 39.9 9.8 1 3 .7 
6.0 5 .3 24.4 37.6 8.4 12.9 
5.5 4.7 20.5 35.4 7.0 12.2 
5 .0 4. 1 16.9 33.5 5 .8 1 1 .5 
4.5 3 .5 13 .7 3 1 .9 4.7 10.9 
4.0 2.9 1 0.8 3 1 .0 3 .7 10.7 
3 .5 2. 1 8.3 32.3 2.8 1 1 . 1  
Error (rad) = 0.00 102 Error (rad) = 0.00035 
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Table B-4 TLEcEP and TLELEP at Constant 1 7,000 ft AGL Page 1 
TOTAL 
Slant Horizontal TOTAL TOTAL TLEcEP (M) TOT AL TLELEP Range Range TLEcEp (M) TLELEp (M) Less (M) Less 
{NM) {NM) Aircraft Aircraft Error 
Error 
1 5 .0 14.7 223.6 32.9 56.3 3 1 . 1  
14.5 14.2 208.9 32.0 52.7 30. 1 
14.0 13 .7 194.8 3 1 . 1  49.2 29.2 
13 .5 13 .2 1 8 1 . 1  30.2 45.9 28.2 
13 .0 12.7 1 68.0 29.4 42.7 27.3 
12.5 12.2 1 55.3 28.5 39.5 26.3 
12.0 1 1 .7 143.2 27.6 36.6 25 .4 
1 1 .5 1 1 .2 1 3 1 .6 26.8 33.7 24.5 
1 1 .0 10.6 120.4 26.0 3 1 .0 23 .6 
10.5 10. 1 109.8 25. 1 28.3 22.6 
10.0 9.6 99.7 24.3 25 .8 2 1 .7 
9.5 9. 1 90.0 23.5 23.4 20.8 
9.0 8.6 80.9 22.7 2 1 .2 19.9 
8.5 8.0 72.3 22.0 1 9.0 19. 1 
8.0 7.5 64. 1 2 1 .2 1 7.0 1 8.2 
7.5 7.0 56.5 20.5 15 . 1  17.4 
7.0 6.4 49.4 1 9.8 13 .3 1 6.5 
6.5 5.9 42.8 19.2 1 1 .6 1 5 .8 
6.0 5 .3 36.8 1 8.5 10.0 1 5 .0 
5.5 4.7 3 1 .2 1 8.0 8.5 14.3 
5.0 4. 1 26.3 1 7.5 7.3 1 3 .7 
4.5 3.5 2 1 .9 17.2 6.3 1 3.3 
4.0 2.9 1 8. 1  17. 1  5.3 1 3. 1  
3.5 2. 1 14.8 17.5 4.2 1 3 .6 
65 
Table B-5 TLEcEP and TLELEP at Constant 17,000 ft AGL Page 2 
Slant Range Horizontal TOTAL TLELEP (M) Less 
(NM) Range (NM) HAE Error 
15.0 14.7 32.4 
14.5 14.2 31.5 
14.0 13.7 30.5 
13.5 13.2 29.6 
13.0 12.7 28.8 
12.5 12.2 27.9 
12.0 11.7 27.0 
11.5 11.2 26.1 
11.0 10.6 25.3 
10.5 10.1 24.4 
10.0 9.6 23.6 
9.5 9.1 22.7 
9.0 8.6 21.9 
8.5 8.0 21.1 
8.0 7.5 20.4 
7.5 7.0 19.6 
7.0 6.4 18.9 
6.5 5.9 18.2 
6.0 5.3 17.5 
5.5 4.7 16.9 
5.0 4.1 16.5 
4.5 3.5 16.1 
4.0 2.9 16.0 
3.5 2.1 16.4 
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